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Abstract 
European demographers rarely study religion as a determinant of contemporary 
demographic behaviour. One reason could be the secularisation observed in 
European countries, implying that the effect of religiosity has been diminishing. 
This paper aims to show that religion can have an important impact on ideals, 
intentions and behaviour related to fertility.  
First we discuss recent trends in religiosity. We base our ensuing hypotheses 
on three deliberations why religion may have a bearing on fertility: importance of 
religious teaching, effect of social capital and function of religion to decrease 
uncertainty.  
Using FFS data we examine the influence of several measures of religiosity 
on the ideal number of children and intentions to have a second and third child, as 
well as on the expected and actual number of children. We find that all measures 
of religiosity are in general related to a higher ideal number of children, higher 
odds to intend another child and higher expected and actual number of children. 
Participation in religious services turns out to be slightly more salient than 
affiliation and self-assessed religiosity. We also discover that the effect of religion 
on ideals is more pronounced than its effect on intentions. Ideals stay further away 
from behaviour than intentions do and hence the influence of religion is 
intermediated by other social systems. 
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1  Introduction 
Traditional religious teachings advocate life in a sound traditional family with 
many children and take an adverse stand to non-marital sex and thus to 
cohabitation. Yet the demographic changes in Europe during the recent decades 
include a drastic decline in fertility and the increase of non-traditional family 
forms, single-person households and non-marital births. The rise of these trends 
implies that religion may have lost its impact on demographic behaviour. In their 
influential article Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988) addressed this causal link. They 
discussed secularisation and individualisation as the “two most salient features” of 
the ideational shifts that have spread over Europe in the last few decades. They 
considered the rise in individualisation and personal autonomy as opening new 
perspectives and broader choices related to family formation and childbearing. 
Secularisation was a necessary condition for the rise in individualisation as it 
brought about a release of the norms and restrictions that originated in rules and 
rites set by the churches. As secularisation continues the Christian churches are 
less and less capable of influencing people’s behaviour (van de Kaa 1999: 42) and 
religion can, as a consequence, be disregarded. 
Seemingly the secularisation thesis has found a firm ground among European 
demographers, as far as demographic research indicates. Indeed, religion if not 
simply missing in studies of issues related to family formation, has typically been 
included in demographic models in the form of independent variables whose 
explanatory power is restricted to being ‘controlled for’. 
The general negligence of religion is reflected in demographic surveys. If not 
entirely omitted usually only a few questions on religiosity are included. The 
Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS), conducted during the 1990s, contain four 
questions, on self-assessed religiosity, religious affiliation, church attendance and 
importance of God. In the successive study, the Gender and Generations Surveys 
(GGS), the questions on self-assessed religiosity and importance of God were 
dropped. The questionnaire for the second wave of the GGS does not comprise 
any question on religion at all.  
Detailed studies on the effect that religion might have on the occurrence or 
timing of family-related events and fertility are rare, and more likely to be found 
in national demographic studies of countries where religion is particularly 
persuasive, such as Spain (Branas-Garza and Neuman 2006; Adsera 2006a) or 
Italy (Caltabiano et al. 2006). Most recently the following studies took up the 
question on the relation between religion and fertility. 
Adsera (2006a) analysed two Spanish fertility surveys dating from 1985 and 
1999 to compare the impact of religiosity in older and younger cohorts. While her 
findings do not confirm any differences in family size between practicing and 
non-practicing Catholics in the older cohorts, they do for the younger ones. 
Family size of non-practicing Catholics is lower and reaches levels similar to the 




Frejka and Westoff (2006) investigate the importance of religiosity in the 
transatlantic fertility differences. For European countries they state that the risk of 
having two or more children is associated with different religious measures in 
different regions of Europe. In southern Europe church attendance significantly 
determines progression to higher order births while the measure of the importance 
of religion is most relevant in western Europe. The results for religious affiliation 
are mixed. 
Kaufmann (e.g., 2006) tackles the question if the share of religious people in 
European populations will rise due to their higher fertility and to immigration 
from countries where religion is prevalent or, alternatively, if religious apostasy 
will counterbalance these effects. He concludes that the portion of religious 
people will increase due to migration and fertility differentials. 
Adsera’s study on the association between religion and ideal number of 
children in 13 developed countries (2006b) is especially relevant for the work at 
hand. We extend her analysis examining fertility ideals by additionally shedding 
light on fertility intentions and behaviour. Moreover, next to regarding religious 
affiliation and frequency of attending religious services we also employ self-
assessed religiosity and importance of God as measures for subjective religiosity. 
Using ISSP data Adsera showed that weekly church attendance relates to a 
higher ideal number of children, for women more distinctively so than for men. In 
countries where one religious organisation holds a monopoly, religious affiliation 
as such is not reflected by differential fertility ideals conversely to pluralistic 
societies where both, affiliation and participation, matter (p. 279). Pooling data 
for all countries she reports that the ideal number of children is highest for 
conservative Protestants, followed by Catholics, those with other religion and 
mainline Protestants. The ideal family size is lowest for the non-affiliated 
(p. 281). Conducting the analysis separately for different cohorts reveals that the 
importance of affiliation for fertility ideals diminishes with successive cohorts. 
This observation is stronger for women than for men where belonging to a certain 
denomination still makes a significant difference. In accordance with the 
hypothesis that the decreasing influence of religious organisations leads to 
increased disparity between regular and non-regular attendees, Adsera finds that 
church attendance is a strong predictor of ideal family size for younger 
generations, especially for women (p. 282-283). 
Unlike in Europe, research in the USA on the interrelations between religion 
and demographic events related to family formation and fertility reports detailed 
findings. Lehrer (2004) and McQuillan (2004) provide comprehensive reviews. 
However, the concept of religion in the USA differs significantly from that in 
Europe (Frejka and Westoff 2006): religious affiliation and religiosity in the USA 
are considerably higher as compared to those in most European countries, and the 
process of secularisation has not been dominant in this country. While in many 
European countries religious institutions take monopolistic or duopolistic 
positions, the religious structure in the United States is marked by the existence of Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
 
274 
a large variety of denominations. Thus a straightforward transfer of US-related 
findings to European countries without adequate testing or replication can be 
misleading. 
Modifying the secularisation hypothesis, recent sociological research on 
religion in Europe indicates, however, that its importance for societal life should 
not be underestimated. Religion experienced a significant transformation along 
with the overall ideational shifts. Recent decades have witnessed the emergence 
of notions like ‘post-modern’ religion and ‘believing without belonging’, used to 
denote new trends in the development of religiosity. Although these are topics of 
heated debates they indicate that religion and religiosity should not be trivialised 
in studies aiming to understand aspects of contemporary societal life. So are 
demographers missing an important field of research? Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
(1988:  9) noted that the role of religion is neither exhausted nor can it be 
neglected in the study of contemporary fertility and family change. Nearly 20 
years later we have no reason to disregard this warning. 
The study at hand intends to show that contemporary interrelations between 
religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour in Europe are significant 
after all and deserve more attention in demographic research. There are three 
questions to the analysis that follows:  
 
1) Given the erosion of religiosity during the last decades, is religion still an 
important factor for fertility in Europe?  
 
2) Through which channels can we assume religiosity to affect fertility? 
 
3) What empirical associations can we attest between religion and fertility 
ideals, intentions and behaviour? 
 
We first give an overview of the current perspectives about changes in 
religiosity and its persistent importance which we see as being significant for 
demographers. Next we formulate some conjectures on aspects of the relations 
between fertility and religion. We further discuss the measurement of religion and 
continue with an empirical comparative study using the FFS data. We examine 
the association between religion and religiosity on the one hand, and ideal number 
of children, intentions to have a second and third child, expected and actual 
number of children, on the other. Since we provide a comparative study of 18 
European countries it is beyond the scope of this paper to concentrate on the 
explanation of results of single countries. Our empirical data are not suitable for 
the study of any other religious denominations but Christianity because of the 
small number of observations. For this reason this paper focuses only on issues 









2  Recent trends in religion 
Secularisation is a trend that has run for centuries in western Europe. Its roots 
may be found in the Renaissance with the revival of humanism. Prominent 
philosophers and sociologists like Hume, Marx and Weber envisaged the 
disappearance of religion as a result of modernisation of society; scientific, 
technical and economic progress as well as advancement in education. A 
significant decline in religion, if not disappearance, is a position shared by 
numerous researchers both in the past and at present.  
Secularisation is a multifold process that at the macro level applies to society 
as a whole, and at the micro level to individuals. First, it denotes a decline in the 
influence of religion on societal life as institutions of law, administration, 
education, medicine, commerce and so on become separated from church control 
(McQuillan 2004: 32-33). Second, on the micro level, individuals withdraw from 
their religious communities as they cease to take part in regular services as well as 
in religious rites that frame life course transitions and the like. Secularisation on 
the level of the individual also encompasses the decline of religious beliefs and 
private religious practices. 
During the recent decades secularisation has been a topic of debate among 
researchers of sociology of religion. Where Europe is concerned, the decline in 
the influence of the churches is rarely disputed, unlike the decline in religiosity 
not bound to an institution. While some authors indicate the stability or even rise 
in religiosity in Europe, others deny similar conclusions; we present the views of 
both sides briefly.  
A ground-breaking article was contributed by Davie (1990) who found an 
increase in ‘believing without belonging’ (BWB) in a study of changes in 
religiosity in Great Britain. The quoted expression was used to denote persons 
who have religious beliefs and who feel they are religious, but are not attached to 
a church and do not strictly adhere to church rites, rules and practices. The main 
argument is that “Europeans continue to believe in God and to have religious (or 
at least ‘spiritual’) sensibilities: the proportion of believers is high and has 
changed little in recent years” (Voas and Crockett 2005: 12). Several studies have 
provided empirical support. For example, Stark et al. (2005) propose that 
“unchurched religion and spirituality” are on the rise particularly among younger 
cohorts in Sweden and have been persisting in Japan for a long time. Lambert 
(2004), using the three waves of the EVS, concludes that the data of the 
1999/2000 wave suggest a ‘Christian renewal’ and ‘believing without belonging’, 
particularly among respondents aged 18-29. 
Other studies refute the perception that personal beliefs and practices remain 
stable or show an increasing trend even if institutionalised religiosity decreases. 
Based on data that cover the 1990s and others collected between 1983 and 2003 
Voas and Crockett (2005) find that the thesis about a rise of BWB in Great Britain 
does not hold (at least for distinct Christian beliefs as opposed to vague beliefs Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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and spiritual sensibilities). Halman and Draulans (2006), working with EVS data 
from 1999/2000, find that religiosity is lower in countries where the GDP is 
higher and conclude that modernisation of society correlates with a decrease in 
religiosity, which is in line with the secularisation thesis. However, they did not 
find statistically significant differences in the level of religiosity between 
materialists and post-materialists (p. 277). 
Some scholars argue that even if the figures for belonging to a certain religion 
or those that display religious belief show an increase, this can not necessarily be 
explained by a rise in religiosity. Voas and Bruce (2004) provide an interesting 
example by comparing the 2001 census in Britain with the British Social Attitudes 
survey. The former reports 72% Christians in England and Wales, a proportion 
that is considerably higher than that found in the British Social Attitudes survey. 
They explain the mismatch by seeing the census results “to represent increasing 
anxiety about national identity rather than increasing commitment to the Christian 
faith” (p. 28).  
It is not the interest of this paper to provide support for one or the other side, 
i.e., for research that challenges the secularisation hypothesis or for advocates of 
the continuing downward trend even pertaining to private beliefs and practices, 
but we can conclude that religion is a matter of lively debates and as such an 
important topic to be addressed in contemporary demographic studies. 
 
 
3  Religion and fertility: hypotheses 
The complex relations that exist between religiosity and fertility have given rise to 
diverse approaches and classifications on the channels by which they are linked. 
For this reason we propose a brief discussion of three mechanisms that are 
likely to be relevant for the explanation of the impact of religion and religiosity on 
contemporary fertility and family change in the European countries: the impact of 
religious teachings, the impact of social capital and the impact of subjective 
wellbeing and uncertainty.  
Since most religions hold views on issues related to family, children and the 
proximate determinants of fertility it stands to reason to employ them as a starting 
point. The importance of religious teachings for fertility has achieved extensive 
attention among sociologists of religion and demographers. It is presented here in 
a concise form.  
Within Christianity, in the Catholic church contraception and abortion in 
particular have continually been at the centre of hot debates. Marriage and having 
children are encouraged while non-marital sex and non-marital births are 
opposed. The Catholic church holds explicit views on these matters, which are 
given out to their adherents as prescriptions. Followers of the church are expected 
to observe these rules. To a lesser extend, this pattern has been characteristic for 




prohibitions exist. We do not address differences between the Christian 
denominations in detail; this important topic requires comparative discussions 
which are out of the scope of the present paper. McQuillan (2004) provides a 
systematic background on the impact of religion on fertility where differentials by 
affiliation are presented in detail.  
Already Goldscheider (1971) provided some criticism of the perception that 
the existence of a ‘particularised theology’, i.e., explicit teaching on fertility and 
related issues, should necessarily entail accordant behaviour. McQuillan, 
however, warns to reject considerations about any specific religious teaching 
altogether. He claims that “religious teachings touching on demographic issues 
form an important part of a religious world-view, and are a necessary, though not 
sufficient, condition for the formation and continuation of a distinctive 
demographic pattern” (1999: 8). In line with Goldscheider he argues that such a 
world-view goes beyond specific instructions on fertility, but more generally 
includes the perceptions of a religious organisation, notably on gender relations 
and parent-child relationships (McQuillan 1999: 10 and 2004: 26). 
Moreover, religious teachings can have an indirect impact on fertility 
exercised through social norms and values. Christian teaching has permeated 
European societies for centuries. Long-standing religious views have been the 
basis for the rise and spread of relevant social norms and values related to family 
formation and fertility. The non-acceptance of non-marital cohabitation and non-
marital births in traditional societies may serve as examples. Those and similar 
norms and values exercised an effect regardless of whether the decision-makers 
were religious or non-religious individuals. These values have been integrated as 
a solid part of the cultural system of the society and as such have their place in the 
basis of society’s legal system and in the practice of state institutions.  
Recent demographic trends, particularly those that constitute the second 
demographic transition, indicate that the discussion exposed in the preceding 
paragraph relates to a society that can be characterised with traditional 
demographic behaviour. On the level of the wider society churches have lost their 
influence on other societal systems like the state and thus their ability to shape 
social norms and values. 
Yet, on the level of the individual we assume that those who indicate their 
belonging to a certain church against a vigorous countertrend should show a 
particular behaviour, presumably also with respect to childbearing.  
 
H1: Fertility ideals, expected and actual number of children are higher and 
intentions to have another child are more prevalent among those who are 
affiliated, most notably with churches characterised by strong pronatalist and 
pro-family teaching, as compared to the non-affiliated. 
 
The second approach relates to the associations between religion and social 
capital as well as to the effect of social capital on fertility. The impact of religion 
on social capital has been widely noted (Davie 2002; Agadjanian 2001; Waite and Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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Lehrer 2003; Lehrer 2004; Iannaccone 1990
1). Waite and Lehrer (2003) for 
example discuss the influence of parents’ religion on their children’s social 
capital; the latter rises because of the social ties existing among members of a 
religious group. In general, religious persons may feel attached to a social group 
that includes individuals who share similar values and beliefs. They are likely to 
meet at church services or at other occasions and maintain and intensify friendly 
contacts. Religious organisations promote the formation of social networks. 
Just as in secular social networks three types of support are exchanged 
between the church members: emotional, tangible and informational support. In 
addition, spiritual support is exemplary for religious settings (Krause et al. 2001: 
638-639). Social support, received in church context from co-religionists or clergy 
is discussed in the extensive literature on religious coping as a kind of coping 
strategy (e.g. Pargament et al. 2000). Taylor and Chatters showed that church 
attendance, church membership and subjective religiosity are positively and 
significantly associated with the probability of receiving support (Taylor and 
Chatters 1988). More specifically, previous studies have demonstrated, for 
example, that membership in an informal church network increases the likelihood 
to receive advice and encouragement as well as gifts and help with home 
maintenance and running errands (Chatters et al. 2002; Ellison and George 1994). 
Secondly, religious networks are characterised by the existence of shared norms 
and values, like a high appraisal of children and marriage. These views are 
constantly maintained through communication with others and religious texts and 
as such held plausible against competing ones (Berger 1969). As a consequence, 
high fertility ideals and intentions become more likely, and so does having 
children itself. In turn, when a behavioural model is set, especially by people who 
are held in high esteem, other couples are compelled to follow the example. The 
case of social learning might be complemented with social pressure to comply 
with the collective behaviour. 
Several demographic studies have examined the association between social 
capital and fertility and family formation events. The social capital component in 
social interactions can be noted in two ways. First, having children brings about 
an increase in social capital, as noted by Schoen et al. (1997) because close 
relatives and friends may feel attached to the new family member and provide 
support for the enlarged family. Besides, a new baby increases the family’s social 
network with families that are in a similar status because of the commonalities in 
child care. Second, social interactions may be exercised in the form of help and 
support exchanged among social network members (Buehler and Philipov 2005). 
Social network members may provide important information, for example for 
finding a new (or better) job, they can lend money when necessary, help with 
repairs and reconstructions in the home, or provide easy access to babysitting. 
Help and support within the social network usually flow without a requirement for 
reciprocity (i.e., receiving help does not necessarily mean that it must be 
                                                      




returned), or reciprocity can be impersonal (i.e., giving help to any other member 
of the social network, and when help is needed it is not expected only from the 
person to whom help was previously given, but from any network member). 
Buehler and Philipov (2005) defined this form of social capital as social 
networks-based social capital. It is of significance in taking decisions about 
having children because it may relieve the impact of diverse factors that may 
bring about negative consequences when having a child.  
The higher a person’s social capital, the higher the likelihood that this person 
will have intentions for having a child. Schoen et al. (1997) provide empirical 
support for the USA, Buehler and Philipov (2005) for Bulgaria and Philipov et al. 
(2006) for Bulgaria and Hungary. It is of no difference whether one wants a child 
in order to increase one’s personal social capital, as Schoen et al. (1997) argue, or 
whether one wants a child because one’s social capital is already high, as Buehler 
and Philipov (2005) discuss.  
To sum up, religiosity and social capital are positively linked, and the latter is 
associated with fertility intentions, and possibly fertility decisions. Here, 
religiosity mainly refers to organised religions as these are most capable of 
providing an adequate framing. Church attendance is not only a proxy for the 
access to social capital but also for the frequency of exposure to churchly teaching 
and to people who behave accordingly. Transcending the belonging to a certain 
denomination, which can be solely nominal, it implies active participation. We 
therefore expect attendance of church services to be a more decisive determinant 
than religious affiliation. 
 
H2: Fertility ideals, intentions, expected and actual number of children are 
positively associated with church attendance.  
 
H3: Church attendance is a stronger predictor for fertility than religious 
affiliation.  
 
Thirdly, a number of studies confirm the positive effect of religiosity on 
psychological wellbeing and uncertainty. This link goes beyond organised 
religiosity and comprises ‘believing without belonging’ as well. 
The Bible explicitly highlights the role of God as a defender, comforter and 
supporter of humans when needed (e.g., Ps 3; Mt 5:12). Followers of religious 
teachings are advised to rely on God when they need his support. Their belief in 
God helps them to cope with adverse life events and stressful situations. Also, 
religious practices are beneficial in establishing a relation with a higher power. 
Rites of passage, such as baptism or marriage, which exist in many religions, are 
deliberately located at transitory points in life that might imply uncertainty and 
unpredictability. 
Moreover, even though the orientation of the believers towards afterlife has 
decreased markedly some believers are apt to downsize the effect of troubles and 
tribulations in earthly life. Utility of afterlife for them outweighs disutility in 
earthly life.  Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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An abundant literature supports the positive effect of religiosity on subjective 
wellbeing and coping. We give two references that are of interest to 
demographers. Clark and Lelkes (2005) use the European Social Surveys to 
analyse the role of religion in “buffering the well-being impact of stressful life 
events”. They find that religious persons have a higher level of subjective 
wellbeing and are more satisfied with life; for example they experience a lower 
level of stress from unemployment or from a divorce. Lehrer (2004: 720) touches 
the issue in a theoretical framework.  
Religiosity also positively affects the subjective wellbeing and coping through 
participation in religious groups where one can find support when needed. This 
topic relates to the one discussed above about the significance of social capital. 
The effect of religiosity on uncertainty is a specific case of the effect of 
religiosity on subjective wellbeing and coping. Uncertainty relates to events 
expected in the future. The larger the uncertainty, the more likely are individuals 
to postpone or reject events that can happen to bear negative outcomes. This link 
is particularly strong when the events are irreversible and crucial to one’s life. 
Having a child qualifies as an event of this type that can bring about less desirable 
outcomes, such as losing one’s job or worsening living conditions. In such 
situations religious persons will rely on support by the supernatural power and, if 
belonging to a church network, on the help of others, hence the impact of 
uncertainty on their personal decision-making can be less pronounced.  
The influence of the subjective wellbeing and of uncertainty on fertility is a 
relatively new topic of research in demography. Recently Philipov et al. (2006) 
indicated that a higher level of subjective wellbeing correlates positively with the 
intentions to have a(nother) child in Bulgaria and Hungary. The importance of 
economic uncertainty has been studied for a number of European countries. Mills 
and Blossfeld (2005) have discussed different forms of economic uncertainty, 
embedded in globalisation, at length (p. 18-19). They and others have found that 
postponement or rejection of life events such as marriage and having a child are 
reactions to increased uncertainty (Adsera 2005; Kohler et al. 2002). 
While uncertainty has been considered in relation with religion and 
childbearing separately, as revealed by the preceding discussion, the concept is 
rarely to be found in studies dealing with the association between religion and 
fertility. This is unfortunate, also because in addition to being crucial for 
organised forms of religiosity, the function of religion to decrease uncertainty is 
an essential factor for people who have private beliefs and follow private practices 
without adhering to an institutionalised religion. However, they are also likely to 
share creeds with the traditional religions.  
 
H4: Self-assessed religiosity and importance of God are positively related to 
ideals, intentions and expected and actual number of children. 
 
Although so far we have derived our hypotheses from one of the aspects at a time, 
all of them remain valid for one religious measure. For example, the affiliated are 




prone to be exposed to religious teaching, form part of religious social networks 
and show less uncertainty due to the reasons exhibited above. 
Lastly, we present an assumption about the relation between ideals, intentions 
and behaviour using the theory of planned behaviour, proposed by Ajzen and 
Fishbein (Ajzen 1991). According to this theory fertility intentions are a 
proximate determinant of behaviour (i.e., of births). Intentions are formed under 
the influence of a person’s attitudes towards the behaviour, subjective norms 
related to the behaviour, and the perceived control that the person can exercise on 
the behaviour. An impersonalised ideal number of children is a value and values 
shape the attitudes and subjective norms and hence lie further away from 
behaviour as compared to intentions. Therefore, we can deduce that the impact of 
religion is weaker on intentions than on ideals because the latter stay further away 
from behaviour than intentions and are therefore not subject to constraints such as 
financial limitations or difficulties in finding a partner. This would mean that the 
expected strong impact of religion on ideals loosens during the process of 
construction of intentions along with their direct precedents such as personal 
attitudes, subjective norms related to the behaviour, and personal control over the 
behaviour. The expected number of children of childless women can be 
considered as a broader, more vague intention than that for a specific parity. Due 
to a similar, but more concrete rationale we expect religiosity to exert a stronger 
influence on intentions than on behaviour. 
 
H5: Measures of religiosity are more strongly associated with ideals than  
with intentions, and again less strongly with behaviour. 
 
Reverse causality is another dimension in the background of the relations between 
religion and fertility. It can arise because demographic events are contingent 
situations in life. For example, it may happen that the birth of a child alters the 
priorities in life and stimulates thoughts about a meaning in life. Parents might as 
a consequence be more inclined to turn to religious teachings. Also, they may 
become more religious after the birth of their child because they may get attached 
to a social group of parents with young children run by a church (to name only 
two possible reasons). Hence a birth may increase religiosity. Reverse causality 
may arise also where fertility intentions are considered: for example when a 
couple wants to have a child but the expected pregnancy does not come. It is 
unlikely to expect reverse causality where ideal number of children is considered.  
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4  Data and methods 
4.1  Data and measurement of religion 
We use the data of the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS) for European countries 
where at least one question on religion is included in the national questionnaire. 
No such question was asked in France. The FFS questionnaire includes the 
following questions that refer to religion (answers “don’t know” are skipped): 
1. (Number Q916 in the original questionnaire): Are you religious? 
Answers: Yes, somewhat, no 
2. (Q917: asked to those who answered with "yes" or "somewhat" to the 
above question): Which religion do you adhere to?  
Answers:  Catholic; Protestant; Christian orthodox; Freethinking; Jewish; 
Islamic; Other 
3. (Q918): How often do you attend religious services (apart from weddings, 
funerals, baptisms and the like)? 
Answers: More than once a week; once a week; about once a month: only at 
official holidays; once a year; (practically) never 
4. (Q919): How important is God in your life?  
Answers:  Very important; rather important; neither unimportant nor 
important; rather unimportant; totally unimportant 
Table 1 informs about the year of survey, the sample size used in our estimates 
and the questions asked in each studied country.  
The first question measures religiosity, independently of whether it is church 
religiosity or ‘believing without belonging’. The inclusion of the term ‘religion’ in 
the statement, however, induces the reference to an institutionalised religion and it 
is ambiguous and context dependent if people who hold fuzzy, non-Christian 
beliefs or have spiritual sensibilities would indicate to be religious. 
The second FFS question asks for the affiliation. It is a classic one; research 
on religion in the US frequently centres on denomination only. However in 
Europe this question can be ambiguous because it may relate to “natal belonging” 
or national or cultural identity (Voas and Bruce 2004; Day 2006). A close 
interrelation between religion and nation has been noted in several cases, e.g., an 
identification with the Scandinavian state churches that does not involve church 
participation (Stark and Iannaccone 1994: 237-238) A survey in Bulgaria carried 
out in 2002 with a sample of 10,000 men and women aged up to 35 showed that 
90% of all ethnic Bulgarians in the sample adhered to Bulgarian Orthodox and 
44% of the latter stated they are not religious. Orthodoxy is an important 
component of the Bulgarian culture, and 44% of the respondents obviously 
understood the question as asking about culture, not about religion. The ambiguity 
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to? 






is God in 
your life? 
Austria 1995-96  2843  x x     
Belgium (Flanders) 1991-92  3088    x    x 
Bulgaria 1997  1834  x  x  x  
Czech Rep.  1997  1419  x    x  x 
Estonia 1994  1228  x  x    
Finland 1989-90  2637  x   x  
Germany, East  1992  2912  x  x  x  x 
Germany, West  1992  2945  x  x  x  x 
Greece 1999  2145  x  x  x  x 
Hungary 1992-93  3193  x  x  x  x 
Italy 1995-96  3353  x  x  x   
Latvia 1995  1817  x  x  x  x 
Lithuania 1994-95  2205  x  x     
Norway 1988-89  3472      x   
Poland 1991  2957  x  x  x   
Slovenia 1994-95  2185  x  x  x  x 
Spain 1995  3056  x  x  x  x 
Sweden 1992-93  2651      x   
Switzerland 1994-95  2503  x  x  x  x 
 
The third question measures religious practice. It can also be ambiguous 
where fertility is studied, in that a visit to a church can be, for example, either 
because of the wish to participate in the ceremony and/or to meet members of a 
social network. Moreover, parents of young children may decrease their 
churchgoing practices because they need more time to look after the child. We do 
not have an indication about the size of these ambiguities. Furthermore we need to 
take into account that church attendance is of different importance in the different 
denominations. While it is very salient for the Orthodox and prescribed for 
Catholics there is less accordant concern for the mainline Protestants. We need to 
be aware that Muslim women, who are only studied in Bulgaria, generally attend 
collective prayers in the Mosque less often than men do. Hence other religious 
measures such as the frequency of prayer would suit their religious practices more 
adequately.  
The fourth question measures the degree of religiosity of persons who accept 
the existence of God.  
The measurement of religion and its operationalisation is an issue of 
considerable dispute among sociologists of religion. Huber (2003) presents a Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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detailed discussion. He compared the question on self-assessed religiosity with 
five answering categories with a scale of 10 questions representing an 
operationalisation of 5 dimensions of religion, using interview results from 871 
university students (Huber 2003: 218-219). He found that the correlation between 
the one-item measure and the scale was close to 0.8. This high correlation 
coefficient implies that a single question is convenient for the measurement of 
religiosity. It is hard to expect that detailed measures of religion can be included 
in demographic surveys, and demographers may rely on simplified measures 
based on findings like this one.  
Figures 1a-c and Table  2 show the observed distributions of responses. 
Female respondents below the age of 40 are considered only. Figure 1a displays 
the distribution of answers to the question measuring self-assessed religiosity. It 
reveals that in half of the depicted countries the percentage of religious persons 
exceeds 50%, while in the other half, mostly ex-socialist countries, less than 50% 
declare themselves religious. The difference between ex-West Germany where 
about 60% declared to be at least somewhat religious and former East Germany 
where only 20% did so is in fact noteworthy. The percentage of non-religious or 
only somewhat religious respondents in Poland is very small but due to the large 
sample size the number of these respondents suits the use of statistical models. 
 
Figure 1a: 
Answers to the question “Are you religious?”, women below age 40, in per cent 


























Proportion going to church once a month or more frequently, women below age 40, 
in per cent  



















Proportion for whom God is very important or important, women below age 40, in 
per cent 
 












Note: In Figure 1a the countries are presented in a descending order according to the percentage for “Yes” 
answers. Data are weighed.  
 
Figure 1b gives the percentage of respondents who attend religious services 
once a month or more frequently. Poland and Italy, known for high religiosity of 
their population, indeed exhibit the highest levels of church attendance. At the 
other extreme are the Nordic countries and several ex-socialist countries including Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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the eastern provinces of Germany. Figure 1c presents the proportion for whom 
God is very important or important. Belgium (Flanders) for which no numbers 
have been displayed previously is approximately found in the middle of the range.  
Table 2 gives the distribution by religious denomination. The category 
‘freethinker’ was frequently mixed with other denominations in country-specific 
questionnaires, therefore it is unfit for international comparisons. Hence, given we 
can interpret this category as ‘believing without belonging’, we cannot effectively 
include this status in our study as it was done by Halman and Draulans (2006). 
We recall that the FFS surveys were carried out during the 1990s, most of them in 
the beginning of the decade, and two at the end of the 1980s; at the time of its 
organisation the debate around BWB and unchurched religion was yet to come.  
Within-country comparisons between adherents to Catholicism and 
Protestantism are effective in some countries, predominantly western Germany, 
Switzerland and Latvia. The Orthodox Church prevails in Greece and in Bulgaria; 
about 8% of the respondents in the latter country adhere to Islam. This is the only 
country where the number of Muslims is presented satisfactorily from a statistical 
point of view.  
 
Table 2:  
Distribution by Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Freethinkers and non-affiliated, 
women below age 40, in per cent (weighted) 
   Catholic  Protestant  Orthodox  Freethinker  Non-affiliated 
Austria  53    3    0    4  40 
Belgium (Flanders)  82    0    0    7  11 
Bulgaria    0    0  57    1  34 
East Germany    4  13    0    0  83 
Estonia    1  40    5    0  54 
Greece    0    0  94    0    5 
Hungary  46    9    0    0  45 
Italy  91    1    0    0    9 
Latvia  21  19  23    0  37 
Lithuania  86    1    3    0    9 
Poland  98    1    0    0    1 
Slovenia  72    1    3    1  24 
Spain  77    0    0    3  19 
Switzerland  53  38    1    0    7 
West Germany  34  27    0    0  39 
Note: The proportion of non-affiliated respondents was estimated from the question on self-assessed religiosity. 
 
 
4.2  Interpreting associations between religion and fertility  
The previous discussion indicated that there exist two-way interrelations between 
religion and fertility behaviour. The operationalisation and measurement of 




Religion is measured at the time of survey while the reported births took place 
before the survey. So the use of statistical models relates to the measurement of 
association rather than causality. In order to interpret associations just as well as 
causalities we would need additional information that is not directly available in 
the data.  
A number of studies highlight changes of religiosity in a population. These 
changes can occur by age, by cohorts or by periods. There is a large debate in the 
literature on what effect is the dominating one. Some research in the US indicates 
that young adults’ religiosity increases with age. Argue et al. (1999) report that 
religiosity increases faster in the age interval 18-30. Stolzenberg et al. (1995) 
found that family formation events have a significant effect for the increase of 
church membership by age 32. However, Chaves (1991) who studied Protestant 
church attendance reports a significance of cohort effects along with the age 
effects, and Miller and Nakamura (1996) in their study of church attendance 
patterns found that age effects are offset by intergenerational change. Studies 
referring to the UK indicate that cohort effects are the dominating ones. Crockett 
and Voas (2006) state that “Britons do not get more religious as they get older”, 
and Voas and Crockett (2005) find that the decline in religiosity is generational. 
They consider religious affiliation, attendance and belief. An analysis by Tiley 
(2003) indicates that family formation does not cause greater religiosity and that 
generational differences cause both age differentials and the overall decline in 
church attendance in Britain. Hamberg (1991), however, using panel data for 
Sweden from 1955 and 1970 found the decline in religious beliefs to be due both 
to cohort and age effects. We conclude this review with Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 
(1988) who argue that secularisation develops through the sequence of cohorts.  
The studies mentioned above usually indicate that change in religiosity by age 
refers mainly to a change in its intensity when measured by religious practices. A 
young mother or father may start visiting church services more frequently, for 
example to enable the child to make similar positive church related childhood 
experiences like she or he had; inversely the parent can reduce frequency of 
church attendance because she or he needs to devote more time to the baby. 
However, we have found no reports of a change in religiosity by age when 
measurement of religiosity is dichotomised. That is, it might rarely happen that a 
demographic event invokes a change from the status of being religious, 
independent of the degree of religiosity, to the status of being non-religious, or 
vice-versa. More frequently, changes can occur between various degrees of 
religiosity, such as being religious or somewhat religious.  
The problem of association and causality is considerably different in the case 
of intentions to have a second or third child as well as the ideal number of 
children. Although both are measured at the time of survey, like religiosity, there 
may also be reverse causality. However, it is hard to imagine that there are many 
situations where intentions to have a second or third child or views about the ideal 
number of children may influence religiosity. In the case of intentions, one can Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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speculate that religiosity may change after the couple has been waiting for a 
further child for too long. We were able to control for this effect by including a 
variable that describes the interval since the last birth.  
It is thus convenient to assume that reverse causality does not have a 
significant effect on model results. We do not take this statement for granted 
unless it gains some support from the empirical research.  
 
 
4.3  Variables and models 
 
We apply regression models. The dependent variables are defined as follows.  
The ideal number of children is measured by the question: “How many 
children do you think is the ideal number of children for a family to have in this 
country?” The answers included undefined numbers such as ‘2 or 3’, ‘3 or 4’. The 
latter were rounded to the lower number, in these cases to 2 and 3 
correspondingly. The results would not have changed substantially if the numbers 
had been rounded to the upper one, or if midpoints, for example 2.5, had been 
inserted. The variable used includes the five categories of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or more 
children. Ordered logistic models were applied.  
A second dependent variable used was the expected number of children for 
childless women. Respondents who answered positively to the question about 
their intentions to have children (“Do you want to have children of your own some 
time?”) were asked about the number of children they would like to ever have. 
The results were estimated using linear regressions. 
Intentions were measured with the question “Do you want to have another 
child sometime?” for women who have at least one child. Answer options were 
“yes”, “no” and “don’t know”. The latter was included because of the sizeable 
number of uncertain respondents. In fact, on average 15.7% (std.dev.: 8.4) of 
female respondents below age 40 were undecided whether to intend a second 
child, and 14.4% (std.dev.: 6.2) indicated that they did not know whether to want 
a third child. Related results for religious respondents were nearly identical. 
Morgan argued that the inclusion of uncertain fertility intentions should not be 
dispensed with and proposed that they take up a middle position between certain 
intentions to have or have not a child in the future (Morgan 1981: 267). We 
applied ordered logistic models to the variable thus constructed.  
We do not analyse intentions to have a first child. Contemporary low fertility 
levels are mainly due to the low number of second and higher-order children, and 
the increase in childlessness only explains a small proportion of the overall recent 
fertility decline in Europe. Expectably, most respondents who have no children 
declare their willingness to have a child. Thus the variance of this variable is 
small and it is unsuitable for the application of statistical models in most of the 




The influence of explanatory and control variables on the actual number of 
children was estimated by means of linear regressions. 
All variables on religiosity were used as qualitative ones. The levels are 
defined as follows: 
 
- Self-assessed religiosity: three categories of yes, somewhat, no; 
 
-  Religious affiliation: Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox and non-religious. 
Muslims are only included in Bulgaria. The actual categories depend on the 
availability of each denomination in the country under study. The category of 
freethinkers was excluded from the analysis together with all other religions; 
 
- Church attendance: two levels, at least monthly and less than monthly, are 
considered; 
 
- Importance of God: three categories of (1) very important and important, (2) 
neither important nor unimportant, (3) unimportant and very unimportant are 
defined. 
 
For reason of comparability we employed the same reference category in one 
set of models for all countries. If, however, a given group was too minor to be 
suited for the statistical models we changed it in the country concerned. 
In all models we apply one and the same basic set of independent variables to 
control for age, marital status, level of education and employment. We also 
experimented with the variable on the number of children of the respondent’s 
mother. Since there were only minor changes in the results, however, we regard 
this variable as endogenous and did not introduce it in the final models.  
 
 
The variables were defined as follows: 
 
- Age: four age groups are used defined for the intervals <25 years, 25-29, 30-
34 and 35-39 completed years of age. Respondents aged 40 and above were 
skipped from the analyses;  
 
- Marital status: the following four states of being single, living in a non-
marital cohabitation, being married and divorced or widowed respectively are 
considered; 
 
-  Level of education: three levels are considered as follows: (1) below 
secondary, (2) secondary completed and (3) higher than secondary; 
 
- Employment: the two states of being employed or unemployed at the time of 
interview.  
 
When studying intentions we include a different additional control variable. It 
describes the interval since the birth of the preceding child. With respect to 
intentions for a second child this is the period since the birth of the first child, and 
for intentions to have a third child it is the period since the birth of the second Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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one. Birth order is defined according to the number of children being alive at the 
time of interview. The time since the last birth is measured in months. 
The control variables are not analysed in this paper, nor are they shown in the 
model results discussed in the next chapter. The purpose of the model use is only 
to track the significance of religion on ideals, intentions and behaviour, and not to 
study the latter.  
When studying intentions to have a child of a particular birth order we select 
the women exposed to the risk of birth of child of this order, out of all women. 
We experimented with Heckman selection models; the results did not support a 
significant effect of this selection and therefore we do not discuss them. 
We applied the models for each country separately. Another way to proceed 
would be to pool the datasets and add a country dummy (Adsera 2006b). Since we 
are interested in the effect of religiosity within a given context we studied 
individual countries. Also, the size of the samples allows for such an approach. 
 
 
5  Descriptive analysis 
 
In the first piece of analysis we present some selected descriptive results. Table 3 
shows our dependent variables by the different levels of self-assessed religiosity. 
In all cases, with the exception of Bulgaria and Latvia, the mean ideal number of 
religious people exceeds that of the non-religious, on average by 0.17 children.  
Considering the expected number of children for childless women reveals that 
for the religious group the mean number lies above the replacement level of 2.05 
whereas non-religious childless women expect 1.85 children on average. 
The proportion of religious one-child mothers who want a second child lies on 
average about 8% higher than the proportion of non-religious women. Religiosity 
appears to be more relevant for the intention to have a second than to have a third 
child. The differences between religious and non-religious women are markedly 
more pronounced in the former than in the latter case. Bulgaria and the Czech 
Republic are exceptions to this rule.  
The difference in the actual number of children between religious and non-
religious women amounts to 0.22 children on average and is largest in Greece, 





Ideal number of children, intentions to have a second and third child respectively 




























Austria  No 2.20  1.77  50.1  16.3  1.01 
  Yes 2.33  2.01  59.4  16.8  1.39 
Bulgaria  No 2.35  1.88  38.9  8.5  1.19 
  Somewhat 2.33  1.86  31.4  7.4  1.20 
  Yes 2.34  1.83  39.3  13.6  1.18 
Czech Rep.  No 2.06  1.95  56.2  6.6  1.23 
  Somewhat 2.17  2.01  57.4  8.2  1.30 
  Yes 2.35  2.33  63.9  30.7  1.42 
Estonia  No 2.80  1.93  72.6  31.5  1.48 
  Somewhat 2.84  1.84  64.5  29.4  1.71 
  Yes 2.81  s.n. 63.6  s.n.  1.43 
Finland  No 2.63  1.86  68.8  35.8  1.09 
  Somewhat 2.77  2.15  61.9  36.1  1.33 
  Yes 2.92  2.22 s.n.  45.3  1.42 
Germany,  No 1.82  1.46  22.9  3.4  1.44 
East  Somewhat 1.97  1.62  26.2  4.9  1.52 
  Yes 2.19  s.n. s.n.  18.0  1.55 
Germany,  No 2.05  1.58  30.0  9.3  0.94 
West  Somewhat 2.21  1.76  25.8  8.8  1.14 
  Yes 2.23  1.96  50.4  7.7  1.22 
Greece  No 2.52  2.21  s.n.  s.n.  0.66 
  Somewhat 2.61  2.28  74.4  20.4  0.75 
  Yes 2.73  2.29  77.1  27.5  1.11 
Hungary  No 2.28  2.03  43.5  7.7  1.38 
  Somewhat 2.32  2.01  53.5  6.4  1.42 
  Yes 2.34  2.23  49.8  8.7  1.48 
Italy  No 2.13  1.80  42.1  9.5  0.58 
  Somewhat 2.22  2.08  36.0  s.n.  0.70 
  Yes 2.38  2.12  60.6  14.5  0.90 
Latvia  No 2.44  2.10  44.3  13.5  1.36 
  Somewhat 2.38  2.01  48.4  12.6  1.32 
  Yes 2.44  2.21  51.3  12.2  1.32 
Lithuania  No 2.28  1.54  53.5  18.4  1.05 
  Somewhat 2.30  1.95  57.4  11.4  1.18 
  Yes 2.40  1.92  57.6  19.2  1.17 
Poland  No s.n.  s.n.  s.n.  s.n.  s.n. 
  Somewhat 2.15  s.n.  s.n.  s.n.  0.95 
  Yes 2.36  1.37  51.5  11.8  1.45 
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Slovenia  No  2.10  2.07  62.3  20.4  0.90 
  Somewhat  2.19  2.11  63.5  15.8  1.16 
  Yes  2.40  2.37  71.2  25.6  1.29 
Spain  No  2.18  1.94  57.7  21.2  0.67 
  Somewhat  2.26  2.11  74.5  21.2  0.88 
  Yes  2.42  2.31  72.6  23.9  1.05 
Switzerland  No  2.31  1.64  s.n.  16.1  0.74 
  Yes  2.45  2.25  63.8  16.4  1.05 
Note: s.n. indicates that n<30 cases 
 
 
6  Results and interpretations 
 
The estimates about the association between religious affiliation and the five 
response variables (Table 4) disclose an explicit relation between them.  
The ideal number of children is significantly higher for members of a certain 
Christian church than for the non-affiliated. This inference holds throughout the 
countries with the exception of Bulgaria and Poland (the number of non-religious 
persons in this country is very small), and of Latvia where there is no difference 
between Catholics and the non-affiliated but the Protestants show a higher ideal 
number of children.  
The effect of denomination is traceable as well: in the Baltic countries, the 
Orthodox have a significantly lower ideal number of children than the reference 
group. In general, there is no statistically significant difference between Catholics 
and Protestants with the exceptions of Latvia and Switzerland. 
Concerning the expected number of children for childless women, in 9 out of 
the 14 countries under study non-religious women differ from the religious base 
category. Protestants and Catholics differ in Latvia, but not in western Germany, 
Switzerland and Hungary.  
 





Association between religious affiliation and ideal number of children, childbearing 
intentions and expected number of children: ordered logistic regression results for 
women below age 40 















Austria  Cath. (base)  0  0 0  0 0 
  Protestant  0.04 s.n.   s.n.  0.57 -0.03 
  Non-relig.  -0.48*** -0.31 ***  -0.67***  -0.03  -0.07** 
Belgium   Cath. (base)  0 0   0  0  0 
(Flanders)  Non-relig.  -0.48*** -0.37 ***  -0.81**  -0.09  -0.06 
Bulgaria  Orth. (base)  0 0   0  0  0 
  Muslim  0.16 s.n.   s.n.  0.26  0.28*** 
  Non-relig.  0.12 0.00   0.06  -0.25  0.11*** 
Estonia  Prot. (base)  0 0   0  0  0 
  Orthodox  -1.38*** s.n.  -1.21**  -0.69 -0.09 
  Non-relig.  -0.26** -0.11  -0.24  -0.06  -0.13** 
Germany,  Catholic  0.36 s.n. s.n.  0.29  0.02 
East  Prot. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Non-relig.  -0.56*** -0.20  -0.12  -0.35  -0.05 
Germany,  Cath. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
West  Protestant  -0.05 -0.09 -0.44* -0.37  0.07** 
  Non-relig.  -0.50*** -0.26*** -0.45**  -0.53** -0.04 
Greece  Orth. (base)  0 0  s.n.  0  0 
  Non-relig.  -0.35* -0.09  s.n.  -0.19 -0.10 
Hungary  Cath. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Protestant  0.07 0.09  -0.29  0.19  0.00 
  Non-relig.  -0.15* -0.07  -0.34*  -0.13 0.02 
Italy  Cath. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Non-relig.  -0.77*** -0.32*** -0.19  0.01  -0.12*** 
Latvia  Cath. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Protestant  0.80*** 0.25**  0.71**  0.39  0.13** 
  Orthodox  -0.84*** -0.10  -0.12  -0.01  -0.24*** 
  Non-relig.  0.05 0.08  -0.19  0.12  -0.04 
Lithuania  Cath. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Orthodox  -0.77*** s.n.  -0.24  -0.13 -0.02 
  Non-relig.  -0.36** -0.37** -0.20  -0.04  -0.14*** 
Poland  Cath. (base)    0 s.n. s.n.  0  0 
  Non-relig.  -0.27 s.n. s.n.  -1.7  -0.18 
Slovenia  Cath.  (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Non-relig.  -0.54*** -0.19**  -0.46*  -0.26  -0.17*** 
Spain  Cath. (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
  Non-relig.  -0.55*** -0.31*** -0.63***  -0.17  -0.12*** 
Switzerland Cath.  (base)  0 0 0  0  0 
 Protestant  -0.29*** -0.02  -0.28  -0.42** 0.05 
 Non-relig.  -0.36** -0.42** -0.89**  -0.47  -0.14** 
Notes: ª childless women (aged 18-35); *** denotes p>0.01; ** p>0.05; * p>0.10; s.n. indicates that n<30 cases. Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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The association between religiosity and intentions to have a second or third 
child is also positive, although in fewer countries a statistically significant 
difference between religious and non-religious women can be observed as 
compared to ideals. However, the signs of the coefficients support the hypothesis 
that affiliated people have higher odds of intending another child. For the 
intentions to have a second child, the differences by denomination resemble those 
observed for the ideals: in the Baltic countries Orthodox adherents have lower 
odds than Catholics or Protestants, and in some countries, namely West Germany, 
Hungary and Switzerland, the coefficients indicate higher intentions for Catholics 
as compared to Protestants.  
With regard to the intentions to have a third child it is only in western 
Germany and Switzerland that statistically significant differences can be observed 
between non-religious people and Catholics and Catholics and Protestants, 
respectively.  
The actual number of children differs in two thirds of the countries 
significantly between the affiliated and their non-religious counterparts. In 
Bulgaria, western Germany and Latvia we can observe differences between 
denominations as well. Judging from the p-values, affiliation plays a more 
important role for the actual number of children than for fertility intentions. 
Nevertheless, the fact that we observe high significance levels of religious 
measures for many countries provides only a limited indication and not 
conclusive evidence of the higher importance of religious measures for some 
dependent variables than for others. 
Relating our empirical results back to the hypotheses, we can confirm our first 
one which stated that ideals, expected number of children, intentions and actual 
number of children are higher for the affiliated than for the non-affiliated. Since 
the dataset regrettably does not contain the distinction between mainline and 
conservative Protestants, we can neither draw conclusions for the different groups 
of Protestants, nor fully explore the differences between Protestants and Catholics 
in particular. 
We have further attained first insights into addressing the fifth hypothesis 
which assumed that religious measures are more strongly linked with ideals than 
with intentions. The data so far are in line with this expectation. We also 
hypothesised that religious measures should matter more for intentions than for 
actual behaviour. The results as yet do not support this expectation, but we will 
resume the question after further estimations. 
As to church attendance (Table 5) there are statistically significant differences 
between those who attend church less and those who attend more than monthly at 
the low p-value of p>0.01, Latvia constituting the only exception. Apart from 
Bulgaria where the frequency of church attendance is negatively associated with 





Association between attendance of religious services and ideal number of children, 
childbearing intentions and expected number of children: ordered logistic regression 
results for women below age 40 (#) 
 
















Bulgaria  Less than 
monthly  0 0  0  0  0 
  At least 
monthly  -0.50*** -0.06  -0.71***  0.21  -0.19*** 
Less t. m.  0  0 s.n.  0  0  Czech 
Republic  At least m.  0.70*** 0.37***  s.n.  1.61***  0.17*** 
Finland  Less t. m.  0  0  s.n.  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.79***  0.58***  s.n.  0.44  0.26*** 
Germany,  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
East At  least  m.  0.56***  0.18  0.27  0.41  0.04 
Germany,  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
West At  least  m.  0.50***  0.25***  0.74*** 0.33  0.14*** 
Greece  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.51***  0.16***  0.50*  0.63***  0.05* 
Hungary  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.38***  0.16**  0.44  0.29  0.01 
Italy  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.28***  0.16***  0.53***  0.40**  0.07*** 
Latvia  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  -0.05  0.23***  0.49*  0.10 -0.08 
Norway  Less t. m.  0  0  s.n.  0  0 
 At  least  m.  1.19***  0.27***  s.n.  0.53* 0.11*** 
Poland  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.54***  0.14**  0.97***  1.20***  0.12** 
Slovenia  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.73***  0.25**  0.35  0.39**  0.19*** 
Spain  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.52***  0.29***  0.09  -0.11  0.05* 
Sweden  Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0 
 At  least  m.  0.56***  0.47***  -0.52  0.43  0.01 
Less t. m.  0  0  0  0  0  Switzer-
land  At least m.  0.72*** 0.34*** 1.06** 0.64*** 0.28*** 
 
Notes: (#) The base category is “Less than monthly”;  
ª childless women (aged 18-35);  
*** denotes p>0.01; ** p>0.05; * p>0.10;  
s.n. indicates that n<30 cases. Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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With regard to the expected number of children the differences between 
frequent and infrequent churchgoers become insignificant in Bulgaria and eastern 
Germany. 
As observed in the previous models, less countries than in the case of ideals, 
namely 7 out of 12, differ significantly with respect to the intentions to have a 
second child and 7 out of 15 differ when looking at the intentions to have a third 
child. In all countries but one or two, respectively, the coefficients go in the 
expected direction, however. 
The religious variable again shows increased importance for actual behaviour 
as compared to fertility intentions. In four countries, eastern Germany, Hungary, 
Latvia and Sweden there is no statistical significant difference between the two 
categories. 
To summarise, we can confirm our second hypothesis of the positive 
association between church attendance and fertility ideals, intentions and 
behaviour. In line with our third hypothesis we have found that church attendance 
is a stronger predictor of fertility than affiliation alone. Again there is evidence 
that religion is more important for ideals than for intentions and for the actual 
number of children than for intentions. 
Next, we investigate the two measures of subjective religiosity, i.e., not 
necessarily bound to an organisation, namely self-assessed religiosity (Table 6) 
and importance of God (Table 7). 
The estimates about the association of self-assessed religiosity with the 
dependent variables reveal an explicit relation, though to a varying degree, 
between them. The higher the religiosity, the higher the ideal number of children, 
and the statistical significance of the association is valid at a low p-value, p>0.01, 
in most countries. This inference holds throughout all cases, with the exception of 
those countries where fertility ideals do not differ by religiosity: Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Switzerland. The results indicate the significance of the category ‘somewhat’ 
in the case of self-assessed religiosity: out of 16 countries where it was applied, in 
6 countries it was found to be statistically different from the category identified 
with the answer ‘no’. In general, in some countries where the measure of church 
attendance shows significant results, self-assessed religiosity does not. One 
explanation could be that churchgoers constitute a subgroup of those who indicate 
to be religious which then entails that the former are more homogeneous and 
show a more pronounced behaviour. The idea that the care for children prevents 
mothers from going to church does not seem to be significant. 
As compared to the influence of self-assessed religiosity on ideals, the 
religious variable is relevant for the expected number of children in fewer 
countries. 




Table 6:  
Association between self-assessed religiosity and ideal number of children, 
childbearing intentions and expected number of children: ordered logistic regression 
results for women below age 40 (#) 
 















Austria No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Yes  0.47***  0.31***  0.68***  0.06  0.05* 
Bulgaria No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  -0.10  0.01  -0.05  0.10  -0.07** 
 Yes  -0.12  0.03  -0.01  0.75***  -0.10** 
No 0 0  0  0 0  Czech 
Republic  Somewhat 0.30*  0.09  0.20  0.82***  0.04 
 Yes  0.78***  0.38***  0.41  1.60***  0.12** 
Estonia No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.11  -0.07  -0.09  -0.05  0.12** 
 Yes  0.05  s.n.  -0.55  0.40  0.05 
Finland No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.34***  0.27***  -0.22  0.08  0.04 
 Yes  0.73***  0.38**  s.n.  0.26  0.16** 
Germany, No  0  0  0  0  0 
East Somewhat  0.48***  0.10  0.20  0.48*  0.05 
 Yes  1.17***  s.n.  s.n.  1.09**  0.10 
Germany, No  0  0  0  0  0 
West Somewhat  0.47*** 0.21***  0.12  0.42*  0.06* 
 Yes  0.54***  0.37***  0.97***  -0.02  0.10** 
Greece No  -0.43**  -0.13  s.n.  -0.83  -0.11 
 Somewhat  -0.17  -0.04  0.35  -0.55  -0.05 
 Yes  0  0  0 0  0 
Hungary No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.12  -0.01  0.26  0.16  -0.03 
 Yes  0.19**  0.18**  0.30  0.26  -0.01 
Italy No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.31  0.27**  -0.30  s.n.  -0.02 
 Yes  0.80***  0.32***  0.22  -0.01  0.12*** 
Latvia No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  -0.19*  -0.10  0.30  -0.02  -0.04 
 Yes  -0.01  0.10  0.27  -0.06  0.04 
Lithuania No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.13  0.45**  0.17  -0.40  0.15*** 
 Yes  0.43***  0.41**  0.23  0.25  0.12** 
Poland  No -0.44* s.n.  s.n.  (+)  -0.16 
 Somewhat  -0.14  s.n.  s.n.    -0.19 
 Yes  0  s.n.  s.n.    0 



















Slovenia No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.14  0.00  0.33  0.00  0.06 
 Yes  0.76***  0.26***  0.52*  0.43*  0.21*** 
Spain No  0  0  0  0  0 
 Somewhat  0.21*  0.19**  0.69**  0.14  0.11*** 
 Yes  0.64***  0.37***  0.59**  0.22  0.13*** 
No 0 0  0  0 0  Switzer-
land  Yes 0.23  0.40**  0.78*  0.25  0.17*** 
 
Notes: (#) The base category is “No”, except for Greece and Poland where it is “Yes”;  
ª childless women (aged 18-35);  
*** denotes p>0.01; ** p>0.05 and * p>0.10;  
s.n. indicates that n<30 cases; 
(+) The model did not converge. 
 
Intentions to have a second child are, in accordance with the findings so far, 
again less influenced by religiosity than the ideal number of children. In the case 
of self-assessed religiosity we find that it is statistically significant with higher 
odds to intend having a child in one third of the countries where the question was 
asked. However, in most countries, the signs of the coefficients support the 
hypothesis that more religious persons will have higher odds of intending to have 
a second child. For the intentions to have a third child it can be noted that while 
the variable loses significance in some countries, in others it gains in significance 
for the third child only. Examples for the first instance are Austria, Spain and 
Switzerland. In other countries, like Bulgaria or the Czech Republic, self-assessed 
religiosity gets important only when looking at the intentions to have a third child. 
This observation was less relevant for church attendance. In line with the pattern 
observed so far, the association with religiosity is again stronger for the actual 
number of children, only in eastern Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia and 
Poland do non-religious and religious women not differ significantly from each 
other. The importance of God (Table 7) turns out to be a relevant predictor as 
well, it is even significant for the ideal number of children in Latvia and 
Switzerland where religious and non-religious women did not differ with respect 
to the previous variables. Interestingly, unlike the other measures this one seems 
to be more relevant for the intentions to have a third than a second child.
2  
                                                      
2 We note that the assumption of a selection process in the transition to higher parities is plausible, 
even though our experiments with the Heckman selection models did not explicitly reveal such 
selectivity. The level of selection is likely to vary by country since the country-specific institutional 
and ideational setting facilitates or impedes transition to higher-order births. Those having two or 
more children are less selected in contexts in which progression to higher parities is comparatively 
easy. Our results are not straightforwardly interpretable in the light of this general deliberation since 
facility of childbearing has changed substantially over time. (We would like to thank Alicia Adsera 




Table 7:  
Association between importance of God and ideal number of children, childbearing 
intentions and expected number of children: ordered logistic regression results for 
women below age 40 (#) 
 















Belgium  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
(Flanders)  Neither-nor  0.16 0.14 0.40  -0.34 0.04 
  Important 0.48***  0.48***  0.32  0.05  0.09** 
Czech  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
Republic  Neither – nor  0.13  0.05  0.95***  0.27  -0.01 
  Important 0.66***  0.27** 0.66  1.38***  0.11** 
Germany,  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
East  Neither – nor  0.41***  0.08  0.29  0.43*  -0.01 
  Important 0.75***  0.17  0.10  0.68** 0.09** 
Germany,  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
West  Neither – nor  0.22**  0.32***  0.30  0.36  0.06* 
  Important  0.56*** 0.44*** 0.47**  0.78*** 0.10*** 
Greece  Unimportant -0.89***  -0.28**  s.n.  s.n.  -0.02 
  Neither – nor  -0.63***  -0.11  s.n.  -0.76  -0.11* 
  Important 0  0 s.n.  0  0 
Hungary  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
  Neither – nor  0.16  0.06  0.17  -0.37*  0.03 
  Important 0.27***  0.15** 0.34* -0.03  0.01 
Latvia  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
  Neither – nor  0.45***  0.14  0.08  1.00***  0.16*** 
  Important 0.44***  0.20** 0.27  0.90***  0.11** 
Slovenia  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
  Neither – nor  0.36***  0.07  0.21  0.51**  0.12*** 
  Important 0.92***  0.16  0.80***  0.77***  0.24*** 
Spain  Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0 
  Neither – nor  0.42***  0.20**  0.94***  -0.72*  0.06 
  Important 0.82***  0.44***  1.22***  -0.65*  0.09** 
Unimportant  0 0 0 0 0  Switzer-
land  Neither – nor  0.23*  0.23**  -0.05  0.61*  0.07 
 Important  0.56***  0.27**  0.30  1.21***  0.20*** 
 
Notes: (#) The base category is “Unimportant” except for Greece where it is “Important”;  
ª childless women (aged 18-35); 
*** denotes p>0.01; ** p>0.05 and * p>0.10;  
s.n. indicates that n<30 cases. 
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Concerning the former, only in Greece and Belgium no difference from the 
baseline category can be noticed. The coefficients in Hungary and Spain point in 
an unexpected direction. Again, importance of God is more relevant for the actual 
number of children than for intentions but the difference is modest. 
Hence our forth hypothesis that predicted a positive association between 
subjective religiosity and ideals, intentions and behaviour is supported. We can 
now conclude that religiosity plays a more important role for ideals, i.e., for a 
value, than for intentions. This is in line with the theory of planned behaviour 
according to which it can be deduced that the impact of religion is weaker for 
intentions because they stay closer to behaviour as compared with ideals. This 
would mean that the observed strong impact of religion on the ideals loosens 
during the process of construction of intentions along with their direct precedents 
such as personal attitudes, subjective norms related to the behaviour and personal 
control over the behaviour. 
Is this observation expected? If we considered the impact of one or more 
components of another social system on fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour, 
such as those related to education or labour, the observation would hardly be 
classified as unexpected. Education, work, culture and other social systems have 
an impact on fertility that has been studied by using diverse variables in model 
frameworks that account for the significant interrelationship among these systems. 
Religion, however, occupies a specific place in a society’s social structure. 
Traditionally it has been a system that spans the entire societal structure and so 
permeates all other social systems like the ones mentioned above. 
The influence of secularisation has brought an end to this hierarchical position 
of religion though. In contemporary times it is a part of the overall societal 
structure, one of many social systems that may interact with others (Dobbelaere 
1995). This is what we observe in fertility. While religion may have a strong 
impact on impersonal values related to fertility, such as the ideal number of 
children, the impact is lower for intentions and behaviour because it is 
intermediated by components of other social systems. Apparently this conclusion 
holds where personal autonomy prevails and the impact of religious institutions 
and the restrictive power of norms have little relevance to a person’s decision to 
have a child or not.  
Unexpectedly though, religious measures have a stronger impact on the actual 
number of children than on fertility intentions. We might speculate that religious 
people’s intentions are more stable and also that they are more prone to realise 
them than are non-religious people. Also, the observed higher importance for 
actual behaviour could possibly be the result of reverse causality as the turn of 
people toward religiosity when having children raises the impact of this variable. 
Thirdly, we can conjecture that we are facing selectivity in the way that religion is 
important for the transition to each parity and that the effects are thus cumulative 
and seem stronger when the overall number of children is considered. Lastly, we 




intentions than for actual behaviour simply does not hold. At this point we can 
only offer plausible interpretations without assessing their validity. 
 
 
7  Conclusion  
 
Religion occupies a modest place in the research on contemporary fertility in 
Europe. Its impact has been considered in detail mainly in a historical perspective, 
for example in studies of the first demographic transition. Probably it is believed 
that persistent secularisation on the continent has rendered it a topic of secondary 
importance. However, the debate about the rise in new forms of religion indicates 
that religion is far from being extinguished. Regardless of whether these new 
forms stand for a revival of religion, its persistent importance, or are merely a 
stage in secularisation, there is sufficient ground to expect its further impact on 
demographic behaviour and fertility in particular.  
We first gave some thought to the channels by which religion and fertility are 
linked. Beyond the conventional approach to the influence of religion, the actual 
teaching, we considered the impact of social networks and social capital, as well 
as factors like subjective wellbeing and uncertainty. There is no claim that the 
three issues we have raised here do indeed exhaust the background of religion’s 
impact on demographic behaviour. However, based on the discussion we 
constructed plausible hypotheses the validity of which was empirically tested. It is 
also conceivable that other factors influence both fertility and religiosity, so that 
they are the outcome of a third variable rather than being directly associated with 
each other. 
We did not discuss expected differences between denominations in our 
framework. This important topic deserves a special attention that is outside the 
scope of the paper. 
We found that in most of the countries affiliated people have higher fertility 
ideals, higher odds of intending to have another child and a higher number of 
expected children than non-affiliated persons. The differences between Catholics 
and Protestants are not clear-cut which we assume to be partly due to the missing 
differentiation between mainline and conservative Protestants. Actual Protestant 
fertility is higher than that of Catholics in Latvia and western Germany. The FFS 
data allowed a comparison of fertility preferences among Orthodox adherents 
relative to Catholics and Protestants, at least in the three Baltic countries. 
Orthodox adherents revealed lower figures all over for ideals, intentions to have 
another child and actual fertility. Several reasons, in particular ethnicity (Russians 
dominate among the Orthodox adherents in the Baltic countries) and/or socio-
economic differences, could contribute to this result. It is, however, beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore these factors in detail. 
We found a strong impact of attendance of religious services and can confirm 
that this measure is a slightly more relevant predictor than affiliation alone. Only Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and behaviour  
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Bulgaria constitutes an exception in that the coefficients are reversed as compared 
to the other countries. A higher intensity of self-assessed religiosity is positively 
associated with the measures of fertility even if slightly less strongly than 
attendance of religious services.  
The stronger impact of religion on ideals as compared to intentions and 
behaviour is interpreted with the significant interactions that exist between the 
religious social system on the one hand and other systems on the other. Thus 
religion does not take a hierarchical position among the social systems where 
fertility is considered. Unexpectedly, religion exerts a larger impact on the actual 
number of children than on fertility intentions. Our results support those of 
Adsera (2006b) who studied fertility ideals in greater detail, e.g., across cohorts 
and sex, and confirmed the importance of church attendance and affiliation for the 
ideal number of children. Our study contributes to an increased understanding of 
the influence of additional religious measures, not only on ideals but also on 
intentions to have another child, as well as on the expected and actual number of 
children. 
This discussion of course begs the question that can well be expected: if 
religion induces higher ideals, intentions and number of children, then why do 
countries with highest levels of religiosity, such as Italy and Spain, experience 
some of the lowest fertility levels in Europe? In this respect, Adsera (2006a) has 
pointed out the possible interrelation between the dramatic decline in fertility 
rates and the impressive decline in church attendance in Spain. We do not dispose 
of panel data to compare these trends, however. Another plausible answer could 
be based on the inference that religion as a social system interrelates with other 
social systems and this interaction may reduce its effect on fertility behaviour. 
Understanding the nature of these interactions is apparently of primary 
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